

August 28, 2026, Civil Law & Motion Tentative Rulings

1. CL0002989 Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. vs. Kevin J. Beard

Plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.'s unopposed motion to deem requests for admissions admitted is granted unless Defendant Beard serves, before the hearing, a proposed response to the requests for admission in substantial compliance with Code of Civil Procedure Section 2033.220.

Request to Deem Matters Admitted

A party may move for an order deeming its Requests for Admission ("RFAs") admitted if the party to whom they are directed has failed to serve a timely response. Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.280(b). "The court shall make this order, unless it finds that the party to whom the requests for admission have been directed has served, before the hearing on the motion, a proposed response to the requests for admission that is in substantial compliance with Section 2033.220." Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.280(c). Responses are due within 30 days after service of the discovery. Code Civ. Proc. §2033.250(a). Response time is extended by manner of service. Code Civ. Proc. § 2016.050. Service by mail extends the deadline by 5 calendar days. Code Civ. Proc. § 1013(a).

At bar, Plaintiff served its RFAs on November 19, 2025 by mail, making December 24, 2025 the deadline for Defendant to serve a timely response. Agne Decl., ¶¶ 1-2. Plaintiff has not received any response from Defendant. Agne Decl., ¶ 2. Therefore, the matters specified in Plaintiff's RFAs are deemed admitted, unless defendant serves, before the hearing, a proposed response to the requests for admission in substantial compliance with Code of Civil Procedure Section 2033.220.

Sanctions

Plaintiff's notice states, "Plaintiff is waiving all sanctions that may be awarded by the Court." Notice of Motion, 1:28. Ordinarily "[i]t is mandatory that the court impose a monetary sanction ... on a party ... whose failure to serve a timely response to the [RFAs] necessitated this motion." Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.280(c). The Court accepts Plaintiff's knowing and voluntary relinquishment of its right to sanctions.

2. CU0001323 Ryan Shirley vs. Dynasty Valley, LLC

Plaintiff's motion to approve PAGA settlement is continued on the Court's motion to December 18, 2026, in Department 6 at 10:00 a.m. to allow for adjudication of Defendant's motion to file certain confidential and trade secret information under seal. Further, Plaintiff is ordered to file the supplemental declarations discussed in the supplemental brief from Settlement Administrator ILYM Group, Inc. and Plaintiff Ryan Shirley at least ten (10) days prior to the continued hearing date.

3. CU0001813 USA Bath California Remodeling, Inc. vs. David Sweat

One of the parties apparently reserved this date for the filing of a motion; none was filed. This matter is removed from calendar.

4. CU0002305 Jason Christ v. Jordan Hannah

Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Jason Christ's motion to strike portions of defendant's answer and cross-complaint is granted in part.

Meet and Confer

Defendant argues that Plaintiff failed to meet and confer prior to filing the motion to strike. Defendant appears correct. "Before filing a motion to strike pursuant to [Code of Civil Procedure sections 435 to 437b], the moving party shall meet and confer" Code Civ. Proc., § 435.5(a). There is no evidence that Plaintiff did do here. That said, "[a] determination by the court that the meet and confer process was insufficient shall not be grounds to grant or deny the motion to strike." Code Civ. Proc., § 435.5(a)(4). "If, upon review of a declaration under section [435.5(a)(3)] a court learns no meet and confer has taken place, or concludes further conferences between counsel would likely be productive, it retains discretion to order counsel to meaningfully discuss the pleadings with an eye toward reducing the number of issues or eliminating the need for a demurrer, and to continue the hearing date to facilitate that effort." *Dumas v. Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors* (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 348, 355, fn. 3. Here, the Court does not believe further conferences are necessary and turns to the merits. Plaintiff shall comply with all required meet and confer requirements hereafter under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Legal Standard

"Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof" Code Civ. Proc. § 435(b)(1). "The court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, ..., and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court." Code Civ. Proc. § 436.

Answer

Frivolous Claim

Plaintiff moves to strike Defendant's "frivolous claim" affirmative defense arguing it is not an affirmative defense and that it is a legal conclusion. Point one of this argument has merit.

"An affirmative defense is 'new matter constituting a defense' ... and is defined as '[a] defendant's assertion of facts and arguments that, if true, will defeat the plaintiff's or prosecution's claim, even if all the allegations in the complaint are true.' " *Morris Cerullo World Evangelism v. Newport Harbor Offices & Marina, LLC* (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 1149, 1158,

citing Code Civ. Proc. § 431.30(b)(2)), and Black's Law Dict. (11th ed. 2019) p. 528, col. 2. "Because an affirmative defense can only defeat a plaintiff's claim, and [a]ffirmative relief is 'an award, such as damages, that goes beyond merely defeating the plaintiff's recovery', it follows logically that an affirmative defense cannot give rise to affirmative relief such as damages." *Ibid.*, citing *City of Stockton v. Superior Court* (2007) 42 Cal.4th 730, 746, fn. 12.

Such is the case here. Defendant alleges as a defense that Plaintiff's claim is frivolous, reserves the right to dismiss the same, and reserves the right to seek fees and costs "pursuant to statute," apparently a reference to Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5. This "defense," as articulated, will not *defeat* Plaintiff's claims *per se*. Moreover, the defense potentially seeks affirmative relief—fees and costs. The frivolous claim defense, therefore, is properly stricken from the answer, without prejudice. Both parties may, as they deem warranted, seek relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5 by noticing, filing and serving an appropriate motion.

Indemnification and Apportionment of Fault

Plaintiff moves to strike Defendant's "allegations of cross-complaint" affirmative defense, arguing the paragraph is uncertain and not drawn in conformity with California pleading requirements. The Court agrees.

"The answer to a complaint shall contain: (1) [t]he general or specific denial of the material allegations of the complaint controverted by the defendant ... [and] (2) [a] statement of any new matter constituting a defense." Code Civ. Proc. 431.30(b).

Defenses should be relevant to a plaintiff's legal claims and averred carefully, and with as much detail as the facts constituting the corresponding causes of action in the complaint. *FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima* (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 384. They should not be proffered in the form of "terse legal conclusions." *Ibid.* "The defenses shall be separately stated, and the several defenses shall refer to the causes of action which they are intended to answer, in a manner by which they may be intelligibly distinguished." Code Civ. Proc., 431.30(g).

"However, [n]o error or defect in a pleading is to be regarded unless it affects substantial rights The primary function of a pleading is to give the other party notice so that it may prepare its case ..., and a defect in a pleading that otherwise properly notifies a party cannot be said to affect substantial rights. *Harris v. City of Santa Monica* (2013) 56 Cal.4th 203, 240 [internal citations and quotation marks omitted].

At bar, the affirmative defense of "allegations of cross-complaint" does not state any specific facts; moreover, it is unclear which allegations are asserted as an affirmative defense as to which cause of action. The motion to strike is granted as to this affirmative defense.

Cross-Complaint

Indemnification and Apportionment of Fault

Plaintiff argues indemnification and apportionment of fault are not cognizable causes of action. The Court disagrees.

Plaintiff summarily argues that the causes of action are not cognizable and fail to state facts sufficient to constitute claims but does not provide the Court with meaningful, legal authority or cogent argument to support his request for relief. The motion to strike as to these causes of action is denied.

Punitive Damages

Plaintiff argues the cross-complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to support an award of punitive damages.

A plaintiff can recover punitive damages in tort cases where “the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.” Civ. Code §3294(a). “The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages. [Citation.] Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim. [Citation.]” *Grieves v. Superior Court* (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166, fn. omitted.

Relevant here, the term “malice” as used in the statute means “conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” Civ. Code § 3294(c)(1).

“Oppression” means “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” (Civ. Code, § 3294(c)(2). While the term “despicable” is not defined in Civil Code section 3294(c), the term includes “circumstances that are ‘base,’ ‘vile,’ or ‘contemptible.’ [Citation.]” *College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court* (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725 (*College Hospital*). “Despicable conduct” for purposes of an award of punitive damages means “conduct that is ‘so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people.’ ” ... [Citation.]” *McNeal v. Whittaker, Clark & Daniels, Inc.* (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 853, 872. “ ‘The wrongdoer “must act with the intent to vex, injure, or annoy, or with a conscious disregard of the plaintiff’s rights [citations].” ... Punitive damages are proper only when the tortious conduct rises to levels of extreme indifference to the plaintiff’s rights, a level which decent citizens should not have to tolerate.’ ” *Tomaselli v. Transamerica Ins. Co.* (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1287 (citations omitted).

At bar, the cross-complaint alleges: (1) “Defendant intentionally and unlawfully made harmful and/or offensive physical contact with Plaintiff’s person. Plaintiff did not consent to such contact.” Cross-Complaint, pg. 4. (2) “Defendant accosted and moved toward Plaintiff in a threatening manner. Plaintiff did not consent to Defendant’s conduct.” *Id.*, pg. 5. (3) “Defendant engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct toward Plaintiff, including but not limited to repeated verbal abuse, public humiliation and threats of harm.” *Id.*, pg. 6. (4) “Defendant intentionally and unlawfully restrained, detained, and confined Plaintiff against Plaintiff’s will, Defendant’s actions were without lawful privilege, consent, or justification.” *Id.*, pg. 7.

On this record, Cross-Complainant has sufficiently alleged circumstances of malice and oppression. The motion to strike punitive damages is denied.

5. CU0002418 Andrew Ehlers v. Brandon Murray, et al.

Defendants' unopposed motion for leave to file a cross-complaint is granted. Defendants are ordered to file and serve the proposed cross-complaint attached as Exhibit A to the Declaration within thirty (30) days of the hearing on this motion.

Legal Standard

Code of Civil Procedure § 428.10 provides that a party against whom a cause of action has been asserted may file a cross-complaint setting forth: "(b) Any cause of action he has against a person alleged to be liable thereon, whether or not such person is already a party to the action, if the cause of action asserted in his cross-complaint (1) arises out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences as the cause brought against him or (2) asserts a claim, right, or interest in the property or controversy which is the subject of the cause brought against him." Code Civ. Proc. § 428.10(b). A party shall obtain leave of court to file a cross-complaint if it is not concurrently filed with the answer or at any time before the court sets a trial date. Code Civ. Proc. § 428.50(a)-(b). Leave may be granted in the interest of justice at any time during the course of the action. Code Civ. Proc. § 428.50(c).

If a cross-complaint is compulsory, leave must be granted as long as the cross-complainant is acting in good faith, so as to avoid forfeiture of the causes of action. Code Civ. Proc. §426.50; see *Silver Organizations, Ltd. v. Frank* (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 94, 101 (concluding that the late filing of the motion to file a compulsory cross-complaint absent some evidence of bad faith is insufficient evidence to support denial of the motion). To be considered a compulsory cross-complaint, the related cause of action must have existed at the time defendant served its answer to the complaint. *Crocker Nat'l Bank v. Emerald* (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 852, 864.

Analysis

Defendants move to file a cross-complaint, arguing: (1) they recently learned the insurer providing defense counsel would be unable to pursue affirmative cross-claims on their behalf; and (2) they were awaiting the results of their motion to compel mediation and Plaintiff's motion for leave to file an amended complaint. The Cross-Complaint alleges causes of action for: (1) Breach of Contract; (2) Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; and (3) Negligent Violation of Statutory Duty.

First, Plaintiff has filed no opposition to the motion; as such, the Court deems Plaintiff's failure to oppose the motion as consent to the granting of the same. See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.54(c) ("failure to oppose a motion may be deemed a consent to the granting of the motion."); see, e.g., *Amato v. Downs* (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 435, 440, n.3 (unopposed motion can be granted on that basis, citing rule 8.54(c)).

Second, the Court finds the cross-complaint is compulsory because it arises out of the same occurrence, namely, the contracts for construction services and subsequent work performed.

Moreover, there is no evidence to suggest Defendants acted in bad faith in connection with its request.

The motion is granted.

6. CU0002626 Bank of America, N.A. v. Prashant Tyagi

One of the parties apparently reserved this date for the filing of a motion; none was filed. This matter is removed from calendar.

7. CU0002738 Roberta McGregor v. Victoria Yeager

No appearances are required. The Court, on its own motion, continues the hearing for this motion until September 4, 2026 at 10:00 a.m. in Department 6.

The tentative ruling for purposes of the September 4, 2026, hearing is as follows: Defendant/Cross-Complainant Victoria S. Yeager's ("Defendant") motion regarding discovery is granted in part. The Court grants Defendant's motion for an order deeming its Requests for Admission (Sets One and Two) directed to Plaintiff Roberta McGregor as admitted, *unless Plaintiff serves substantially compliant responses before the scheduled hearing on September 4, 2026*. The Court grants Defendant's motion to compel initial responses to Special Interrogatories (Set One) without objections. The Court grants Defendant's motion to compel further responses to Form Interrogatories (Sets One-Three), Special Interrogatories (Set Two), and Requests for Production of Documents (Sets One and Two) as described below. The Court denies Defendant's request to propound additional discovery. The Court grants Defendant's request for sanctions in part.

Briefing

Under the Civil Rules of Procedure and Rules of Court, a moving party is allowed to file a motion with a memorandum of points and authorities (15 pages maximum) and supporting documents, an opposing party is allowed to file a single opposition with memorandum (15 pages maximum) and supporting documents, and the moving party is permitted to file a single reply (10 pages maximum), all within circumscribed time periods. *See* Code Civ. Proc. 1005(b), Rules of Court, Rules 3.112-3.113. Plaintiff, without leave of Court, filed *multiple* oppositions. This was improper. In the exercise of its discretion, the Court considered the same. Henceforth, all briefing *shall* comply with the requirements of the Rules of Procedure and Rules of Court, *without exception*. The Court, as necessary, will exercise its authority to strike and disregard future filings that do not comply with these rules.

Form Interrogatories

Legal Standard

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.300(a), a court may order a party to serve a further response to an interrogatory when the court finds that: "(1) An answer to a particular interrogatory is evasive or incomplete[;] (2) An exercise of the option to produce documents

under Section 2030.230 is unwarranted or the required specification of those documents is inadequate[; or] (3) An objection to an interrogatory is without merit or too general.”

Upon receipt of a response, the propounding party may move to compel further response if it deems that an answer to a particular interrogatory is evasive or incomplete, an exercise of the option to produce documents under Section 2030.230 is unwarranted or the required specification of those documents is inadequate, or an objection to an interrogatory is without merit or too general. CCP §2030.300(a). Any motion to compel further answers to interrogatories must be filed within 45 days of receipt of response unless the parties agree to extend the time in writing. CCP § 2030.300 (c). When such a motion is filed, the Court must determine whether responses are sufficient under the Code and the burden is on the responding party to justify any objections made and/or its failure to fully answer the interrogatories. *Coy v. Sup. Ct.* (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220-21; *Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Sup. Ct.* (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255.

Analysis

Form Interrogatory (“FI”) No. 17.1 asks, for the responses to requests for admission which are not unqualified admissions, for all facts responses are based upon; names, addresses, telephone numbers of persons with knowledge of those facts; and documents or other tangible things responses are based upon. For all three sets of FIs, Plaintiff failed to provide such information for every RFA that was not an unqualified admission. Therefore, Defendant’s motion to compel a further, verified response to FI No. 17.1, Sets 1-3 is granted.

Plaintiff responded to FI Nos. 4(a) 1.0, 2.2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.11, 2.12, 7.0, 7.1, 7.2, 9.1, 9.2, 12.0, 12.2, 12.3, 12.4, 12.5, 12.6, 12.7, 13.0, 13.2, 14.0, 14.1, 14.2, 50.2 with a single paragraph. Under Code of Civil Procedure § 2023.210(c), “each answer...or objection in the response shall bear the same identifying number or letter and be in the same sequence as the corresponding interrogatory.” Therefore, Defendant’s motion to compel further, verified, code-compliant responses to FI Nos. 1.0, 2.2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.11, 2.12, 7.0, 7.1, 7.2, 9.1, 9.2, 12.0, 12.2, 12.3, 12.4, 12.5, 12.6, 12.7, 13.0, 13.2, 14.0, 14.1, 14.2, 50.2 is granted.

Special Interrogatories

Analysis

Defendant asserts Plaintiff failed to respond to Special Interrogatories (“SIs”), Set One. While Plaintiff alleges in response she did serve responses, the Court is unable to ascertain from her filings if she has actually done so. Therefore, verified responses without objections are required.

Defendant also argues further responses are warranted for SIs, Set Two Nos. 10, 12, 15, 16, and 17. However, her Separate Statement only addresses SI Nos. 10 and 15. Therefore, the Court will only consider those requests. Plaintiff’s response to SI No. 10 states she will provide a response “upon review of ...documents.” That is insufficient. Plaintiff’s response to SI No. 15 identifies a person present but fails to provide contact information, which is also insufficient. Complete responses are required for all interrogatories, including requests to provide names, address, and telephone numbers of persons. Plaintiff is ordered to provide further, verified, code-compliant responses to SI, Set Two, Nos. 10 and 15.

Requests for Production of Documents

An agreement to comply with a document demand must state whether the responding party will be complying "in whole or in part." Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.220. In addition, the response must indicate whether any documents are being withheld based on an asserted objection. Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.240(b).

On the other hand, Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.230 states:

A representation of inability to comply with the particular demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling shall affirm that a diligent search and a reasonable inquiry has been made in an effort to comply with that demand. This statement shall also specify whether the inability to comply is because the particular item or category has never existed, has been destroyed, has been lost, misplaced, or stolen, or has never been, or is no longer, in the possession, custody, or control of the responding party. The statement shall set forth the name and address of any natural person or organization known or believed by that party to have possession, custody, or control of that item or category of item.

On receipt of the response to a document demand, the demanding party may move to compel a further response if any of the following apply: (1) a statement of compliance is incomplete; (2) a representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete or evasive; (3) an objection is without merit or too general. Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.310(a).

Analysis

Defendant seeks further responses to Requests for Production ("RFPs"), Set One, No. 5 and Set Two, Nos. 7-14, 22, 25.

In response to RFP Set One No. 5 and RFP, Set Two, No. 25, Plaintiff responded by including a qualifier "to the extent" that responsive documents are in her possession, they are equally available to Defendant. This response is improper and noncompliant with Code production requirements.

In response to RFP, Set Two, Nos. 7-11, Plaintiff uses improper and non-compliant language, including: "to the extent", "if any" "will produce, or has produced". Additionally, the documents produced have been altered.

In response to RFP Set Two, No. 12, 13, Plaintiff describes a "search of her currently accessible records". Such statement fails to comply with the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 2032.230.

In response to RFP Set Two, No. 14, Plaintiff responds by adding a qualifier, "if any" which is improper and non-compliant.

In response to RFP Set Two No. 25, the text at the end of Plaintiff's response cuts off mid-sentence.

Therefore, further, verified, code-compliant responses to RFPs Set One, No. 5 and Set Two, Nos. 7-14, 22, 25 are ordered.

Requests for Admission

Legal Standard

"The party to whom the requests for admission are directed shall sign the response under oath, unless the response contains only objections."¹ Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.240(a). A "response to [an] RFA ...fail[s] to conform to the statutory prescription" if "it was not signed by a party and was not under oath." *Allen-Pacific, Ltd. v. Superior Court* (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1546, 1550–1551, *disapproved on other grounds by Wilcox v. Birtwhistle* (1999) 21 Cal.4th 973

"Unsworn [or unverified] responses are tantamount to no responses at all." *Allen Pacific, Ltd. v. Superior Court* (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1546, 1550-1551, *citing Appleton v. Superior Court* (1988) 206 Cal. App. 3d 632, 636 and *Zorro Inv. Co. v. Great Pacific Securities Corp.* (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 907, 914.

A party may move for an order deeming the request for admissions admitted if the party to whom they are directed has failed to serve a timely response. Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.280(b). More specifically:

In the event responses to RFAs are not timely served, the responding party waives any objections thereto (§ 2033.280, subd. (a)), and "[t]he requesting party may move for an order that the genuineness of any documents and the truth of any matters specified in the requests be deemed admitted, as well as for a monetary sanction" (id. subd. (b)). Unless the court determines that the responding party "has served, before the hearing on the motion, a proposed response to the requests for admission that is in substantial compliance with Section 2033.220," it must order the RFAs deemed admitted. (Id. subd. (c).) "[A] deemed admitted order establishes, by judicial fiat, that a nonresponding party has responded to the requests by admitting the truth of all matters contained therein." (*Wilcox*, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 979, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 260, 987 P.2d 727.) The court must also impose monetary sanctions upon the party and/or the attorney for the failure to serve a timely response to the RFAs. (§ 2033.280, subd. (c).) But a responding party's service, prior to the hearing on the "deemed admitted" motion, of substantially compliant responses, will defeat a propounding party's attempt under section 2033.280 to have the RFAs deemed admitted. (*Tobin v. Oris* (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 814, 827, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 736 (*Tobin*).) As one court put it: "If the party manages to serve its responses before the hearing, the court has no discretion but to deny the motion. But woe betide the party who fails to serve responses before the hearing. In that instance the court has no discretion but to grant the admission motion, usually with fatal consequences for the defaulting party. One might call it 'two strikes and you're out' as applied to civil procedure." (*Demyer v.*

¹ The exception to this requirement, for responses with only objections, is not at issue.

Costa Mesa Mobile Home Estates (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 393, 395–396, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 260, fns. omitted (*Demyer*).)

St. Mary v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 762, 776.

Analysis

At bar, Defendant argues Plaintiff failed to serve verifications with her responses to Requests for Admission (“RFAs”), Sets One and Two. Plaintiff asserts she served verifications. However, the Court is unable to discern from her filings whether such verifications exist.

Accordingly, the Court grants Defendant’s motion for an order deeming the RFAs Sets One and Two directed to Plaintiff as admitted, unless Plaintiff serves substantially compliant responses, including verifications, before the scheduled hearing.

Leave to Propound Additional Discovery

Defendant seeks leave to propound additional discovery, stating the defective responses require such. That request is denied at this time as premature and denied. Plaintiff must have an opportunity to comply with the dictates of this decision. Thereafter, Defendant may seek further relief by way of noticed motion as deemed necessary.

Sanctions

“[A] pro se lawyer cannot recover attorney's fees as a discovery sanction. [S]ome of the costs that pro se litigants incur, if reasonably identifiable and allocable, are recoverable as sanctions—even though those costs are ones that lawyers ordinarily include in their hourly rates or other fee structures.” *Kravitz v. Superior Court* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1015, 1020. The Court finds an award of sanctions to compensate Defendant for reasonable expenses incurred as a result of the discovery motion is warranted under the circumstances present here. Therefore, sanctions in the amount of \$310.00 payable to Defendant are granted. The Court denies the request for imposition of additional sanctions payable to the Clerk.

8. CU21-086089 George Horner, et al. vs. Deborah Carver

Appearances are required by the parties to discuss the recommendations of the referee regarding the status of the home/property in preparation for the sale of the same.